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Abstract
The Dutch drinking water sector experienced two drastic changes over the last 10
years. Firstly, in 1997, the sector association started with a voluntary benchmarking
aimed to increase the e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness of the sector. Secondly, merger activity
arose. This paper develops a tailored nonparametric model to dissect and distinguish the
e¤ects on e¢ ciency of these two evolutions. In particular, we adapt Free Disposal Hull
(FDH) to estimate robust and conditional non-oriented e¢ ciency estimates. Parametric
COLS (Fourier) tests show the robustness of the model with respect to the specication
and its variables. We classify the merger economies into scale economies and increased
incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies. Although we detect a signicant e¢ ciency enhancing
e¤ect of benchmarking, we nd insignicant merger economies due to the absence of
scale economies and the absence of increased incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies.
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, e¢ ciency, scale economies, water sector, non-
parametric and parametric estimation
JEL Classication: C13, C14, D20, G34, L95
1 Introduction
In 2003, the Dutch parliament decided to reserve the Dutch drinking water sector as a
public domain, implying a moratorium on private investments. This decision was justied
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by the performance of the sector in terms of e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness. However, not even
a few years before, in 1997, the Dutch Ministry of Economic A¤airs launched a program
to deregulate monopolistic markets, among which the drinking water sector. The sector,
represented by the association of Dutch drinking water utilities Vewin, opted for a voluntary
benchmarking to circumvent competition in or for the market. Benchmarking is aimed at
seeking excellence through a systematic comparison of performance measures with reference
standards. Two di¤erent applications of benchmarking can be distinguished (for an overview,
see De Witte and Marques, 2007a). Firstly, yardstick competition which uses the results of
benchmarking to set maximum prices or revenues (Schlei¤er, 1985). This approach is applied
in e.g. the privatized English and Welsh drinking water sector. Secondly, sunshine regulation
which compares and publicizes the benchmarking results. The latter approach is applied in
the Dutch drinking water sector (as is common practice in the Netherlands, we will identify
benchmarking with sunshine regulation henceforth).
In the same time period, intensied merger activity arose. The rst merger wave in the
sector was about eighty years ago when public companies, owned by the municipalities, took
over the municipal services in their search for a minimal scale necessary as a result of new
environmental requirements.1 The second merger wave among the public drinking water
utilities, started in 1996. For this wave, several diverging reasons were present, (1) it was
believed that operating at a larger scale increases the e¢ ciency (scale economies), (2) the
larger scale would enable the owners for more specialized and thus improved supervision
(corporate governance), (3) the larger scale would be needed to comply with environmental
regulation and (4) national and provincial authorities promoted, for the easiness of a coherent
policy, the existence of one drinking water utility per province2 . While there were hundreds
of utilities in 1920, 111 in 1975 and 20 in 1992, only 10 drinking water companies remained
in 2007. Several of them are discussing new mergers, possibly resulting in still less utilities
in the next few years.
The literature is indecisive whether lean rms are mean or whether bold rms are more
beautiful. Much depends on the merger economies. We argue that three specic variants
of merger economies could be present (e.g. Roller et al., 2000). Firstly, although drinking
water utilities operate in a legal regional monopoly, mergers could increase market power
by decreasing the e¤ectiveness of the benchmarking instrument as the number of reference
partners declines. Secondly, by operating at a larger scale, merged rms could benet from
scale economies and lower the production costs in comparison to pre-merged rms. Finally, the
merger could provide the management an enlarged mandate to ght ine¢ ciencies, especially
when cost reductions were promised. Although mergers might be e¤ective to realize the
latter as well, it is not a necessary condition. Therefore, managers and regulators should
1This paper studies both mergers and take-overs, however, for the ease of explanation we use the word
mergerfor both terms.
2There are 12 provinces in the Netherlands.
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carefully evaluate the merits and demerits of all available instruments to execute the latter.
As these three merger economies are partly contradicting, it is crucial to understand whether
mergers result in scale economies or in improved ine¢ ciency reductions since mergers are only
necessary to realize the former. In the absence of scale e¤ects and with other instruments
available to ght ine¢ ciencies, the market power argument advocates a reluctant attitude
towards mergers.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, the paper develops a
tailored nonparametric model which is inspired on Free Disposal Hull (Deprins et al., 1984).
We adapt the FDH model to a non-orientation which simultaneously measures multiple input
reductions and heterogeneous output expansions without assuming any a priori specication
on the functional form of the production set. The non-orientation is particularly convenient
in the current setting as the rms managers are simultaneously considering cost reductions
(i.e. the inputs) and service ameliorations (i.e. the outputs). Secondly, by adapting the
robust order-m e¢ ciencies of Cazals et al. (2002), the model accounts for atypical obser-
vations. Thus, it neutralizes the dependency on one or a few extra-ordinary observations,
the main drawback of deterministic nonparametric techniques Thirdly, the nonparametric
model enables us to to discriminate the e¤ects on e¢ ciency of di¤erent institutional changes
which are happening at the same time. By modifying the procedures of Daraio and Simar
(2005, 2007), the model allows for a richer analysis and results in improved information on
the e¤ectiveness of the evaluated instruments. Fourthly, the paper estimates merger e¤ects
in a benchmarking environment, an issue not explored before. Fifthly, it improves the un-
derstanding of merger e¤ects in the drinking water sector, since currently, only evidence is
available based on UK-data. Sixthly, the results of the nonparametric model are tested and
compared by parametric variants. In particular, we assume a parametric Corrected Ordi-
narily Least Squares (COLS) model to test the robustness of the basic model, and apply a
Fourier function to examine the robustness of an extended model. The paper is the rst in
applying a Fourier parametric cost function, the most exible parametric approach available,
to the water sector. Finally, the paper explicitly discriminates between e¢ ciency e¤ects due
to scale economies and e¤ects as a result of increased incentives to ght ine¢ ciency. This is
important as the rst mechanism necessitates mergers, while the second does not.
The paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, we describe the benchmarking project in Dutch
drinking water sector and review the literature on merger economies (Section 2). Secondly,
we develop a tailored nonparametric model to disentangle the benchmarking e¢ ciency gains
from the total merger economies (Section 3). Our results indicate in the period before the
benchmarking and shortly afterwards (1993-1999) a negative evolution of e¢ ciency, while in
the period 1999-2005 a positive e¤ect of the benchmark is detected (Section 4). Total merger
economies seem to be positive in the two years before the merger till one year after the
merger. However, from then on, we observe merger diseconomies. We test the robustness
of the results by converting the nonparametric model into a parametric COLS specication
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and nd that the results are in general robust (Section 5). We further test the robustness of
the model with respect to the included variables and to the assumed specication (Section
6). In addition, this model allows to break down the overall merger economies into scale
economies and economies resulting from increased incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies. We nd
that both scale economies and incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies are absent. Finally, we provide
conclusions (Section 7).
2 Benchmarking and mergers in the Dutch drinking wa-
ter sector
The focus of this paper is on the e¢ ciency e¤ects of mergers. In this respect, the Dutch
drinking water sector is interesting as large merger activity is present during recent years. In
this paragraph, we explore the possible causes of mergers, its potential impact on e¢ ciency
and argue the importance to know whether merger economies follow from scale e¤ects or
improved incentives to ght ine¢ ciency. At more or less the same time, the introduction of
benchmarking probably inuenced e¢ ciency also. Thanks to the enforced incentive regulation
and to the pressure of all stakeholders the Dutch drinking water sector currently performs
better in terms of e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness than the sectors in e.g. Australia, Belgium,
Portugal or even England and Wales (De Witte and Marques, 2007b). Therefore, analyzing
merger economies necessitates to include the role of benchmarking. We start this section
by motivating the Dutch rationale at that time for choosing for benchmarking, discuss its
specic characteristics and argue the e¤ectiveness of the tool. Next, we discuss the pros and
cons of mergers.
2.1 Benchmarking
The Dutch drinking water utilities provide drinking water to domestic and industrial cos-
tumers. E¢ ciency concerns arose at the Dutch drinking water sector agenda in 1997. At
that time, the Ministry of Economic A¤airs managed a general programme to deregulate
markets with monopolistic power. Among other sectors, drinking water was under review for
deregulation possibilities as utilities were owned by municipal and provincial governments
and operated in a legal monopoly. Due to the potential presence of the quiet life and X-
ine¢ ciencies in the monopolistic framework, e¢ ciency might be at stake. This hypothesis
was further supported by the fact that companies were managed by technocrats who pre-
ferred an increase in drinking water quality and security of water supply, even with unsure
benets and prohibitive costs.
After studying the possibilities to introduce competition on the market (not applied in
other countries), for the market (the French model) or yardstick competition with price regu-
lation (the English and Welsh model), the Dutch parliament decided to introduce benchmark-
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ing as a light handed type of incentive regulation (Dijkgraaf et al., 1997). It was expected to
enhance e¢ ciency and to maintain or even further improve the high levels of quality, security
of supply, investments and the (nearly) absence of leakage. In contrast to other incentive
mechanisms, benchmarking does not necessarily require a strict regulation of quality, security
and investments, and does not change the institutional form of the sector radically. There-
fore, a striking advantage of benchmarking is its absence of an expensive regulation authority
as it leaves all decisions on outputs and service targets to the utility (including the denition
and monitoring of minimum requirements).3
Basically, the benchmark is an information generating instrument. Before 1997, man-
agement and owners of drinking water utilities lacked instruments to assess their e¢ ciency.
The benchmark generates yearly exhaustive information on costs, quality and service levels
which are compared among the utilities by the use of performance indicators.4 Besides the
provision of information at the company level, the analysis is also performed at process level
(e.g. production, distribution, sales, support and general management processes) and even
at subprocess level (e.g. the cost per meter pipe or the cost per installed water meter). The
voluntary benchmark is organized by the sector organization Vewin, the association of Dutch
water companies, which contracted an external consulting rm to manage the benchmarking
process. Every three years, an external report is published, while each year companies receive
a detailed internal report.
From a theoretical point of view, it might be expected that benchmarking is e¤ective.
As benchmarking introduces the same mechanisms as competition on the market, this light
handed type of incentive regulation might even be as e¤ective as the competitive model if the
proper rewards and penalties are available. Similarly with competition on the market, where
management and owners make decisions which are expected to result in better performances
than competing rms, benchmarking triggers the race to the top.5
In practice, benchmarking in the sense of the Dutch model can only be e¤ective in an
adequate naming and shamingframework which depends on internal carrots and external
sticks. Internal carrots arise from the use of benchmarking as a source of information to
stimulate managers to improve performances. Indeed, since 1997, owners explicitly negotiate
contracts with the management about e¢ ciency improvements in relation to nancial re-
wards. Owners have incentives to supply such carrots as they are penalised externally if the
company does not improve e¢ ciency. External penalties originate from public publications
(e.g. in newspapers or sector magazines) and the public debate initiated by these publica-
3The Ministry of Environmental A¤airs sets and monitors bottom-line minimum requirements for quality.
4Note that the rst o¢ cial benchmark report was published in 1999. However, between 1997 and 1999
companies could use information from other reports (e.g., Dijkgraaf et al., 1997) and preliminary results from
the benchmark analysis.
5Kwoka (2006) makes a similar statement discussing competitive possibilities in the U.S. electricity sector.
He states that (p. 128) "How close benchmarking approximates the cost discipline of direct competition is
an empirical question". His empirical analysis shows that both options arrive at comparable cost savings.
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tions. The owners are the municipalities who are represented by the municipal council. As
they are elected by the citizens living in the supply area of the utility, they are sensitive to
this public debate.
Recent evaluations of the role of benchmarking proof the e¤ectiveness of the incentive
in the Dutch drinking water sector. According to Dijkgraaf et al. (2007) and Vewin (2007)
e¢ ciency improved by 23%, while also quality, service and investments have been improved.
This exceeds all expectations as earlier study (Dijkgraaf et al., 1997) estimated a potential
increase in e¢ ciency of 15%. Indeed, as the benchmarking project goes on, the best perform-
ing utilities also improve further their performances. Currently, potential e¢ ciency gains are
estimated at about 20% (Dijkgraaf et al., 2007).
2.2 Mergers
The relationship between e¢ ciency and mergers has been extensively studied in the literature.
Roller et al. (2000) point to three consequences of mergers in their literature review. Firstly,
mergers might result in increased market power which could be exploited by higher prices
and prots. Secondly, mergers could create positive scale economies which enables them to
lower production costs in comparison to the pre-merger rms. Thirdly, merged rms might
have more incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies. While the two latter mechanisms are positive
from a welfare perspective, the former is not. In this paragraph, we briey discuss the three
mechanisms.
Firstly, although even pre-merger drinking water utilities work in a monopolistic environ-
ment (i.e. by law only one company has the right to supply drinking water in a particular
region), e¤ective market power can expand due to mergers as incentive regulation becomes
less practical. For an e¤ective and e¢ cient benchmarking, a minimum number of rms is
required as the comparison of di¤erent entities only generates relevant information if data are
well comparable. A lower number of rms potentially decreases the power of benchmarking
as companies are heterogeneous (major di¤erences exist in e.g. network intensity, the type
of raw water used and the output mix). The one remaining company is e¢ cient by default
after the last merger.6
Secondly, scale economies arise when mergers allow to exploit cost advantages by operat-
ing at a larger scale. The literature provides ample evidence on the water sector to distrust
the scale economies argument. Although scale economies are found for very small companies
(with a scale far below the smallest company in the Netherlands), constant returns to scale
or even scale diseconomies are generally found for larger companies (OECD, 2004). The
6A minimum number of rms is not only necessary for benchmarking in the sense of sunshine regulation,
also in the sense of yardstick competition the analysis becomes intricate when the number of rms decreases.
For price or revenue cap regulation, it is essential for a regulator to know the true cost level, which is
only attainable with comparable data. For this reason, the UK Monopoly and Mergers Commission is very
reluctant to mergers in the drinking water sector in England and Wales (OECD, 2004).
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literature provides evidence for this conclusion using data for drinking water companies in
Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, the United States and Japan.7
Thirdly, increased and accelerated incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies might arise when the
management obtains an enlarged mandate or incentive after the merger to ght ine¢ ciency.
Particularly, when managers convinced the owners to agree with the merger on the basis
of cost arguments and when positive scale economies are not present, management has to
realize its promise by reducing ine¢ ciency. The literature provides only spare evidence on
the size of this e¤ect. For the drinking water sector, only Ballance et al. (2004) analyze
e¢ ciency in relation to mergers, using data for England and Wales. They nd no di¤erence
in e¢ ciency between post-merger and no-merger rms. However, this seems to be in line
with studies from other network sectors. Sung and Gort (2006), for instance, nd no positive
welfare e¤ects in the American telecom sector due to the absence of scale e¤ects, productivity
increases and e¢ ciency gains, while shareholdersvalue remains stable. Kwoka and Pollitt
(2007) nd negative e¤ects of acquisitions in the American electricity sector as e¢ ciency of
the purchaser remained stable while e¢ ciency of the bought rm decreased. However, Ivaldi
and McCullough (2005) arrive at a signicant welfare increase in the railroad sector.
Overall, the literature is suspicious regarding the e¤ects of mergers. Gugler et al. (2003),
for example, studying 114; 000 mergers world wide, conclude that 70% of mergers does not
increase welfare. They conclude that 50% of all mergers results in less prot, while another
20% was only able to increase prots by setting higher prices thanks to more market power.
To conclude, an important di¤erence between the arguments of scale economies and in-
creased incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies is that mergers are only required to realize scale
economies. Although mergers might be e¤ective to increase incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies,
this is not a necessary condition and managers should evaluate the pros and cons of all avail-
able instruments to realize this. In the absence of scale e¤ects and with other instruments
available to ght ine¢ ciencies, the market power argument advocates a reluctant attitude
towards mergers. Given the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and market power and the lack of
evidence for e¢ ciency e¤ects of mergers, it is worthwhile to evaluate in the next sections the
merger economies.
3 A nonparametric model
To analyze merger economies, both parametric and nonparametric techniques can be em-
ployed. The former assumes a particular model to the data and tries to t the data according
to this model. The major advantages of this approach lie in the sound statistical properties
that can be derived from the model and the easiness to include variables correcting for the
exogenous environment. In contrast, the second methodological group does not assume any
7See, respectively, Sauer (2005), Garcia and Thomas (2001), Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000), Martins and
Fortunato (2006), Kim (1987) and Mizutani and Urakami (2001).
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particular functional form, and thus lets the data speak for themselves. Therefore, non-
parametric models can easily handle multiple inputs and heterogeneous outputs scenarios.
Thanks to the recent work of, among others, Simar and Wilson (1998) and Daraio and Simar
(2005, 2007) statistical properties of the estimators can be deduced for nonparametric esti-
mators. In this section, we design a tailored nonparametric non-oriented model (Section 3.1)
to estimate the e¢ ciency of the Dutch drinking water companies. The traditional nonpara-
metric models as developed by, among others, Charnes et al. (1978) and Deprins et al. (1984)
assume that any deviation from the best-practice frontier is attributed to ine¢ cient man-
agement. This is a rather strong assumption, however, as atypical and outlying observations
could inuence the frontier (Section 3.2). To dissect and distinguish the merger economies
from the benchmarking results, we exploit the ideas of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) and
adapt them to our model (Section 3.3).
3.1 Non-oriented e¢ ciency estimation
The bulk of the nonparametric literature on the measurement of e¢ ciency deals with estimat-
ing input-oriented (i.e. for a given output level minimization of the inputs) or output-oriented
e¢ ciency (i.e. for a given input level maximization of the produced outputs). Nevertheless,
in many practical observations rms managers design simultaneous input reducing and out-
put increasing schemes to improve the performance of the entity. Some attempts for non-
oriented models have been made by Charnes et al. (1985), Färe et al. (1985) or Portela et al.
(2003).8 However, none of these models formulated a non-oriented model for the traditional
non-convex Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model, as developed by Deprins et al. (1984). By the
use of the directional distance functions of Chambers et al. (1998), we develop a non-oriented
FDH estimator. The FDH model is convenient as it requires only two minimal assumptions.
Firstly, the production set 	 is assumed to envelop all observed observations . Secondly,
we require monotonicity, i.e. inputs and outputs are freely disposable. This means that more
input (less output) never implies a decrease of the maximally achievable output (minimal
required inputs).
Consider a sample  with n utilities which use p inputs to produce q outputs and label
the corresponding input and output vectors, respectively, as x 2 IRp+ and y 2 IRq+. The set
of all feasible input - output combinations is dened as:
	 =

(x; y)jx 2 IRp+; y 2 IRq+; (x; y) is feasible
	
: (1)
Only imposing free disposability on 	, i.e. if (x; y) 2 	 then (x0; y0) 2 	 for x0  x and
y0  y, and thus allowing for non-convex technologies, the FDH estimator measures the
e¢ ciency of an evaluated entity, denoted by (xo; yo); relative to the boundary of the Free
Disposal Hull. The FDH estimator of 	 is characterized by:
8See De Witte and Marques (2007c) for a survey.
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	FDH =

(x; y) 2 IRp+q+ jx  Xi; y  Yi; (Xi; Yi) 2 
	
: (2)
In Figure 1 where we present a two-dimensional graph with one input variable on the hori-
zontal axis and one output variable on the vertical axis, the frontier appears graphically as
a step-wise function as it searches for every evaluated observation a reference entity which
uses less inputs to produce more outputs. The horizontal distance to the frontier, the input-
oriented e¢ ciency, measures the minimal quantity of inputs required to produce a constant
amount of outputs. This can be estimated by the following mixed integer linear program
problem:
input(xo; yo) = max
8<: j(1  )xo 
nP
i=1
iXi; yo 
nP
i=1
iYi;
nP
i=1
i = 1;
i 2 f0; 1g ; (Xi; Yi) 2 
9=; : (3)
Clearly, 0  input  1 and e¢ cient observations obtain an e¢ ciency score of input = 0:
Alternatively to the linear program formulation, Tulkens (1993) pointed out that a practical
two-step vector comparison algorithm can be used to compute input. The rst step reveals
for each evaluated observation the reference partners, i.e. the set of observations dominating
(xo; yo):
Do(xo; yo) = fijXi  xo;Yi  yo; (Xi; Yi) 2 g : (4)
The second step computes the input-e¢ ciency by
input(xo; yo) = max
i2Do

1  Xi
xo

: (5)
Analogous, the vertically measured output-oriented e¢ ciency estimator maximizes the
outputs for a xed amount of inputs. The mixed integer linear program problem corresponds
to:
output(xo; yo) = max
8<: jxo 
nP
i=1
iXi; (1 + )yo 
nP
i=1
iYi;
nP
i=1
i = 1;
i 2 f0; 1g ; (Xi; Yi) 2 
9=; ; (6)
such that 0  output  1 and e¢ cient observations obtain an e¢ ciency score of output = 0:
Within the set of dominating observations Do the output-e¢ ciency can alternatively be
measured by
output(xo; yo) = max
i2Do

1  yo
Yi

: (7)
Extending the traditional FDH models with ideas from directional distance functions,
as developed by Chambers et al. (1998), allow us to estimate the more realistic non-
oriented e¢ ciency estimates. In particular, we assume the direction of the distance function
as (gx; gy) = (x; y), i.e. simultaneously reducing inputs and expanding outputs. This yields
the following mixed integer linear program:
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Figure 1: FDH best practice frontier
non(xo; yo) = max
8<: j(1  )xo 
nP
i=1
iXi; (1 + )yo 
nP
i=1
iYi;
nP
i=1
i = 1;
i 2 f0; 1g ; i = 1; : : : ; n
9=; ; (8)
An e¢ cient observation which constitutes the frontier obtains a value of non = 0, while
ine¢ cient observations arrive at positive values. Whereas the input-orientation approaches
the frontier horizontally and the output-orientation approaches it vertically, the non-oriented
estimator minimizes the distance to any non-dominated observation in the fourth quadrant
relatively to observation (xo; yo) (see Figure 1). Extending the procedures of Tulkens (1993)
and adapting the FDH directional distance function framework of Cherchye et al. (2001), we
compute rst the non-oriented reference observation for (xo; yo) for the set of undominated
observations as:
(xiD ; yiD ) = min
i2Dundom
r
1  Xi
xo
+ 1  yo
Yi
: (9)
Secondly, we give the benet of the doubt to each observation by estimating the non-oriented
e¢ ciency as the minimal distance to the frontier in either the input or the output-oriented
dimension relatively to this closest reference point (xiD ; yiD ) (with rescaled estimators):
non = max

1  XiD
xo
; 1  yo
YiD

: (10)
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3.2 Mitigating outlier inuence
To mitigate the inuence of outlying and atypical observations and to infer statistical proper-
ties of the estimators, we construct a partial frontier which does not include all observations.
This is important as such observations heavily inuence the e¢ ciency socres in deterministic
frontier models (as in the full FDH frontier model). In our application, outliers could arise
from (1) measurement errors and (2) atypical observations with low or high values for par-
ticular variables. The partial frontier approach, introduced by Cazals et al. (2002), draws
repeatedly (r = 1; : : : ; R) and with replacement for every evaluated observation (xo; yo) a
subsample of size m from the set of dominating observations. For each of the R subsamples
the e¢ ciency score rnon(xo; yo) is estimated along the mixed integer linear program in (8).
Finally, the robust non-oriented order-mestimator is computed as the arithmetic average:
mnon(xo; yo) =
1
R
RP
r=1
rnon(xo; yo). The observations in the reference group change due to
resampling as the evaluated observation (xo; yo) will not always be included in the subsam-
ple we allow for super-e¢ cientobservations. These yield an e¢ ciency score mnon < 0 and
indicate that the observation is performing more e¢ ciently than the average of m reference
observations in the subsample.
We have to specify the parameters m (the number of observations in each drawing) and
R (the number of drawings with replacement) to compute the robust e¢ ciency measure.
Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) suggest to select these m and R which keeps the number of
super-e¢ cient observations unchanged. As in our application, the number of super-e¢ cient
observations is about the same for all values of m and R at less than 1% and as selecting
a di¤erent value does not signicantly changes the results, we arbitrarily set m equal to 60
and R equal to 100.9
3.3 Distinguishing incentives from merger economies
The e¢ ciency in the Dutch drinking water sector experiences the inuence of two move-
ments. The benchmarking project triggers all drinking water utilities similarly since 1997,
while mergers happening in di¤erent years inuence only some of the companies. Disentan-
gling the e¤ect of mergers and benchmarking involves the use of panel data. Two popular
techniques in the nonparametric literature to deal with panel data are Malmquist Indices
and Window Analysis (see e.g. Cooper et al., 2004). As the former tool is mainly used as a
decomposition tool for e¢ ciency and productivity change, we concentrate on the latter. To
detect performance trends of an entity over time, a window analysis operates in a panel data
sample of all observations on the principle of moving averages, such that, each observation
could possibly be compared with its past or future values which are considered as di¤erent
observations. We put the procedure into practice by modifying the environment-corrected ef-
9Detailed results for di¤erent values for m (= 10; 20; : : : ; 80) and for R (= 20; 40; : : : ; 160) are available
upon request.
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ciency measures of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) and by focussing on its reference selection
principle.
To introduce environmental variables Z in the e¢ ciency scores of evaluated entities,
Daraio and Simar (2005) suggest a probabilistic approach which conditions on the envi-
ronmental variable of the evaluated entity, zo. By selecting an appropriate bandwidth h
and by applying a Kernel function K(:), the procedure selects all observations (x; y) in the
neighbourhood of zo :
Do(xo; yojzo) = fijXi  xo;Yi  yo; jzo   Zij  h; (Xi; Yi) 2 g : (11)
The order-m estimator is accommodated by drawing the m observations with a probability
equal to K((zo Zi)=h)=
nP
j=1
K((z zj)=h) such that the robust non-oriented conditional e¢ -
ciency measure mnon(xo; yojzo) is obtained. In contrast to the bandwidth selection procedure
suggested by Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), i.e. the cross-validation criterion, we select the
optimal bandwidth by simple reasoning (and test the robustness with respect to this choice).
Two environmental variables are created to distinguish the benchmark incentives from the
merger economies.
Firstly, to capture the e¤ects of the benchmarking project on e¢ ciency, we construct
a time trend (TIME ). As the drinking water sector is characterized by the nearly absence
of technological development, the e¤ects of benchmarking in TIME will prevail on other
inuences. We expect to nd increased e¢ ciency since 1997, the start of the voluntary
benchmarking. Secondly, in addition to this general pattern, we await to nd inuence on
the e¢ ciency of merging companies from two years before the merger till ve years after the
merger date. To allow for the diverging impact in the years before and after merger, we
assign the value MERGE = 1 corresponding to the year of the merger; value MERGE = 0.9
and 0.8 in, respectively, one and two years before the merger; 1.1 one year after the merger,
and continued up to 1.5. Non-merging utilities or utilities without merging inuence obtain
a time value of MERGE = 0. We experienced with other, less exible specications as well
(e.g. MERGE = 1 in all years after the merger and MERGE = 0 in all years before the
merger) and found similar results.
The determination of the bandwidth for TIME, htime, and hence the window size in the
window analysis, deserves particular attention; although the literature does not make any
suggestion on how to proceed. Indeed, if htime is selected too small, the number of potential
reference partners in the analysis is reduced which dramatically diminishes the discrimination
in the results. Conversely, if htime is too large, the analysis will not be able to detect the
changes over time. In our model we determined htime arbitrarily equal to 3, such that each
utility is compared with utilities from two years before and two years after the evaluated time
zo;time. To test the robustness of the analysis, we experimented with other values of htime as
well (htime = 1; : : : ; 9) and found similar outcomes. We selected the optimal bandwidth for
MERGE as hmerge = 0:3, which corresponds to the selection of observations from two years
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before up to two years after the evaluated observation zo;merge. Again, other experiments
(hmerge = 0:1; : : : ; 0:5) delivered similar results.
As an exploratory tool to verify the e¤ect of environmental variables on e¢ ciency, Daraio
and Simar (2005, 2007) suggest to graphically compare the e¢ ciency estimates mnon(xo; yo)
and mnon(xo; yojzo) by nonparametrically regressing the ratio mnon(xo; yojzo) = mnon(xo; yo)
against Zi. An increasing regression line indicates in our non-oriented model a favorable e¤ect
of the conditioned environmental variable to e¢ ciency (i.e. increasing e¢ ciency for higher
values of Zi), while a decreasing regression denotes an unfavorable e¤ect to e¢ ciency (i.e.
decreasing e¢ ciency for higher values of Zi). The absence of a graphical rst order impact
points to the absence of inuence of the conditioned variable to e¢ ciency. In the multivariate
framework we nonparametrically regress the ratio of the partially conditioned e¢ ciency scores
(conditioned on only one environmental variable, say Z1) to the fully conditioned e¢ ciency
scores (conditioned on both environmental variables, say Z1 and Z2) against the values of the
conditioned variable (i.e. Z2). As an e¢ cient (unconditioned) observation obtains a score
mnon(xo; yo) = 0, the ratio of conditioned to unconditioned variables would yield undened
values. Therefore, we add the value 1 to the results.
Initially, we estimate the full merger economies (i.e. the sum of scale e¢ ciency and
e¢ ciency improvement ceteris paribus the scale), although we relax this assumption in the
following parametric sections.
4 Nonparametric estimations
We apply our model to a data set deduced from the public annual accounts of the Dutch
drinking water companies. The data range from 1992 till 2006. Whereas the Dutch drinking
water sector counted 20 companies in 1992, 10 utilities remained in 2006. To articially
increase the number of observations and to allow for the nonparametric measurement of the
e¤ects of benchmarking and merger economies, we carefully decompose each of the available
variables of the 10 merged companies in 2006 to the initial 20 companies in 1992 (called
henceforth sub-utilities) by relatively to its size extrapolating the growth of the variables in
the merged company to the sub-utility. This proceeds in two steps. Firstly, as we do have
values for the sub-utilities in the year before the merger (T  1), we construct for the merged
company each of the variables in T   1. Secondly, proportionally to the share of the sub-
utility in the merged company, we extrapolate the growth of the merged company between
T   1 and T to the sub-utility. By doing this for every year, we e¤ectively decompose the
data set and capture for each sub-utility the claimed advantages of a merger. As such, we
obtain a sample of 293 observations.10 The Appendix provides an overview of the variable
10Note that we have only incomplete data for one company.
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denitions, the descriptive statistics and the mergers in the Dutch drinking water sector.11
The robustness of the results with respect to the decomposition of the data set is tested in
Section 6.
While we experienced with several input variables (various combinations of total costs,
the wage base, the capital base, the number of connections, the balance sheet value, length
of the mains network as a proxy for capital value and number of employees as a proxy for
labour), the results of these models were very similar to each other. In this article, we report
only the results of real total costs as input variable. Indeed, real total costs allow for a fair
comparison among companies and years as it captures investments in capital and labour,
maintenance expenditures for the infrastructure, outsourcing of employees, customer-related
services, etc. As presented in Figure 2, average total costs of all companies is increasing from
1992 till 2000, while decreasing between 2003 and 2006. As output variables, we adopted the
total volume of drinking water (in million m3) and the number of connections per m3. These
output variables, which are consensual in the literature, capture respectively the scale of the
utility and the number of customers. Both output variables evolve more or less similar to
the input variable.
To disentangle the e¢ ciency changes attributed to the benchmark and e¢ ciency e¤ect
due to mergers, we apply our tailored robust non-oriented conditional e¢ ciency measure. We
present for both conditional and unconditional estimates the averaged results for each year in
Figure 3. Notice that the e¢ ciency scores are very high, i.e. on average the scores are close to
0. This is a consequence of the specic model we apply, that is, a (1) robust (2) non-oriented
(3) conditional (4) FDH model. Each of these four components give in the measurement of
e¢ ciency the benet of the doubtto the observations. Taken together, they signicantly
improve the absolute e¢ ciency level of the results. As in the determination of e¢ ciency we
compare the utilities relatively to each other (cf. relatively to the best practice frontier),
the relative e¢ ciency scores of the utilities do not change due to our assumptions. Also in
the second approach, where we visualize the e¤ects on e¢ ciency of the variables TIME and
MERGE, the (absolute) magnitude of the curvature will be less pronounced in comparison
to models which do not give the full benet of the doubt to the evaluated entities.
Consider Figure 3 where the average conditional and unconditional e¢ ciency scores are
presented for each year. We rst consider the unconditional e¢ ciency scores in which all
utilities are compared with all utilities in the sample. During the rst ve years of the
analysis, the unconditional e¢ ciency scores remain more or less stable at an ine¢ ciency of
11The costs are made comparable as much as possible. Total costs are dened as gross-income minus
environmental taxes (mainly the tax on using groundwater). Large di¤erences in prot policies are corrected
by diminishing total prots and adding a calculated normal return of 6% on equity. Large di¤erences
in appreciation, as a possible source of outliers (see supra), are corrected by diminishing appreciation on
current value (most companies value using historical costs). In addition, corrections are made for incidental
appreciations, penalties paid for fast pay back, incidental costs or income, and other non-regular bookkeeping
measures.
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Figure 2: Evolution of descriptive statistics
2.4%. This contrasts to the average e¢ ciency scores from 1998 (i.e. the rst year after the
sunshine regulation) and 1999 when an initial sharp increase in the e¢ ciency is followed in
2000 by a downswing in e¢ ciency, followed by a steady increase in performances from 2001
on.
A similar pattern can be detected in the e¢ ciency scores conditioned on MERGE as only
utilities in the same stage of the merger are mutually compared, the claimed benets of the
merger are counterbalanced. We observe a steady e¢ ciency level between 1992-1997, followed
by a sharp increase in e¢ ciency around 1998-1999 and a dramatic decrease in e¢ ciency in
2000 after which e¢ ciency gradually improved. In addition, as the average e¢ ciency scores
in each year are higher for conditioned values than for unconditioned, an unfavorable e¤ect
of the conditioned value MERGE could be expected.
Regarding the conditioning on the variable TIME, interesting results arise. These e¢ -
ciency scores capture the e¢ ciency of companies without the e¤ects of the TIME variable.
The results reveal that without benchmarking e¢ ciency would have been dramatically lower
over the period 1992-2006. In addition, it further strengthens the expectation that the in-
crease in e¢ ciency in the Dutch drinking water sector could in particular be attributed to
the benchmark while the merger economies do not signicantly improve e¢ ciency.
As a complementary explanatory nonparametric approach to detect whether the environ-
mental variables TIME and MERGE are favorable or unfavorable to e¢ ciency, we follow the
procedure described by Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007). The results are presented in Figure 4
and 5. First consider the inuence of TIME. In the period 1993-1999, we observe a negative
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Figure 3: Conditional and unconditional e¢ ciency estimates
rst order impact of TIME on e¢ ciency. In the period before the benchmarking and shortly
afterwards the variable TIME has an unfavorable e¤ect on e¢ ciency. In contrast we nd a
positive rst order e¤ect in the period 1999-2005. This allows us to infer the positive role of
the benchmark on the e¢ ciency of the Dutch drinking water companies.
Consider next the impact of MERGE. In the two years before the merger (T   2) until
one year after the merger (T + 1), we detect a positive rst order e¤ect. Over this period of
time, merging carries a favorable inuence over these utilities. From T +1 to T +5 we nd a
negative rst order impact of MERGE. Merged rms experience a unfavorable inuence to
e¢ ciency in this period. We test the robustness of these results in the next sections.
5 A robustness test
This section tests the robustness of the results with respect to the estimation technique
(parametric versus nonparametric) using the same disaggregated data set as before. This
contrasts to the next section, where we test parametrically the robustness of the selected
variables and the applied disaggregation of the data set.
To relate the costs of drinking water utilities to its inputs and outputs, a cost function
is estimated. The unexplained costs (the residuals) are considered as an approximation of
the ine¢ ciency. Estimating the cost function in logs, the e¢ ciency is measured by the use
of the residual of company i in year t, denoted by i;t. In particular, the e¢ ciency equals
ei;t   1, where i;t equals i;t - min(). This corresponds to a Corrected Ordinary Least
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Squares (COLS) methodology where the average cost function is pushed inwards towards the
most e¢ cient observation.12 Similar with the nonparametric approach, e¢ ciency is supposed
to be a function of benchmarking and merger activity. Again, the merger economies are
approximated by the variable MERGE, and the benchmarking by TIME and its square to
allow for non-linear e¤ects. To mimic a parametric variant of the nonparametric model, we
opted for a Cobb-Douglas (CD) specication as it reects a similar relationship between costs
and outputs. Compared to the nonparametric specication, the main di¤erence in the CD
model is the introduction of the input prices which results in a cost minimizing function with
input and output prices on the right-hand side. The model is summarized as:
Ci;t =  Qi;t +  PLi;t +  PCi;t +  Coni;t + 1 TIME + 2 TIME
2 +  MERGEi +i;t
(12)
where Ci;t denotes the total real cost for company i in year t, Qi;t the produced quantity
of drinking water, PLi;t the real input price of labour, PCi;t the real input price of capital,
Coni;t the number of connections perm3 and i;t the error term after subtracting the average
e¤ect of TIME and MERGE. All variables are measured in logs as the underlying production
function is multiplicative.
The results are presented in Table 1. The coe¢ cient for Q implies decreasing returns
to scale as an average increase in production of 1% results in a 1:09% increase in costs.
Although its coe¢ cient is close to 1, the constant returns to scale hypothesis (i.e. Q = 1)
is rejected at the 5%-signicance level (but not at 1%). As could be expected, costs are
signicantly increasing with the input prices. A higher number of connections per m3 results
signicantly in a cost increase, which is natural since for a constant level of production
more connections have to be served. Similar to the nonparametric estimations, the trend
variable TIME suggests the e¤ectiveness of the benchmarking tool as a signicant bell-
shaped relationship between TIME and e¢ ciency is detected. While e¢ ciency decreases
between 1992 and 1997, it stabilizes in 1998 and 1999 and increases from 2000 on. According
to the model, in 2006 the e¢ ciency level increased with 16% compared to 1997. As the
benchmark project was able to turn the decreasing e¢ ciency trend, the introduction of the
benchmark resulted probably in even higher e¢ ciency gains than if it would not have been
established. Finally, we nd signicant negative merger economies since mergers decrease
the e¢ ciency by 7%. In contrast to the nonparametric specication, where only negative
e¢ ciency results were detected after the rst year of the merger, the parametric specication
does not nd a bell-shaped e¤ect of mergers (presented in model B of Table 1). Besides the
latter remark, the analysis demonstrates the robustness of the nonparametric results with
respect to the functional form. In the next section, we proof the robustness of the results
12See Greene (1980) for technicalities. The drawback of COLS is that the entire residual is supposed to
represent ine¢ ciency. Results for Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Coelli and Perelman, 1999), which
makes it possible to split the residual in an ine¢ ciency term and noise, are highly comparable. Results are
available upon request.
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Table 1: Parametric robustness test
Model A Model B
Linear e¤ect of MERGE Quadratic e¤ect of MERGE
Constant -4.34 -4.37
(0.43) -0.43
Q 1.09 1.09
(0.02) (0.02)
PL 0.44 0.44
(0.10) (0.10)
PC 0.39 0.39
(0.02) (0.02)
Con 0.13 0.13
(0.04) (0.04)
TIME 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01)
TIME2 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
MERGE 0.07 -0.01
(0.02) (0.09)
MERGE2 0.08
(0.08)
R2 0.96 0.96
Standard errors between brackets.
** denotes signicance at 1%.
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with respect to the employed variables and data set.
6 The origins of merger economies
In this section, we take advantage of a particular characteristic of parametric models relative
to their nonparametric counterpart. Parametric analysis makes it possible to correct for a
larger set of exogenous di¤erences between companies in comparison to the nonparametric
models (in their given state of technology). This might be important for two reasons. Firstly,
if characteristics di¤er between merged and non-merged companies, the estimated merger co-
e¢ cient could be biased if the model does not take the diverging characteristics into account.
Assume, for instance, that utilities using groundwater, which only have low purication costs,
do not merge, while utilities using river water, which have much higher purication costs, do
merge. If not accounted in the model, the merger coe¢ cient will additionally pickup the cost
di¤erence between using groundwater and river water suggesting an e¢ ciency decrease after
merger. Secondly, it enables us to break down the overall merger e¤ect into scale economies
and economies resulting from more incentives to ght ine¢ ciency for a given scale. As the
former e¤ect is only attainable by mergers, while the latter e¤ect is also achievable without
merger (see supra), it is important to know which merger e¤ect prevails.
Although we use the same data sources of the previous sections (i.e. based on annual
reports and sector publications), the disaggregation level di¤ers to allow for separating the
merger economies into scale e¤ects and ine¢ ciency reducing abilities. Obviously, the former
requires that variables are measured at the true scale as breaking down merged rms into
sub-utilities underestimates scale e¤ects in a parametric framework.
Although parametric cost functions generally assume a Cobb-Douglas (CD) or Translog
specication13 , we apply the Fourier specication as this functional form has some exible
characteristics. The Fourier cost function adds sine (sin) and cosine (cos) terms to the
Translog model, which adds in turn quadratic terms to the CD specication. The Fourier cost
function does not only allow for linear relationships as in CD and non-linear causalities as in
Translog, but for almost innitely exible relationships.14 As such, the Fourier specication
is a generalization of these models. While CD and Translog specications only exploit the
dominating trend in the data, and provide as such only a local approximation for the unknown
function, the Fourier model estimates a global alternative as it exploits the variability over
the whole range of data. In fact, the Fourier specication provides a framework to estimate
cost parametric function with a exibility comparable to a nonparametric approach (Kuenzle,
2005). Empirical studies for banking (e.g. Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Humphrey and Vale,
2004), aviation (Creel and Farell, 2001), farmers (Ivaldi et al., 1996) and electricity (Dashti,
13See e.g. Kuenzle (2005) and Martins and Fortunato (2006) for a discussion on parametric models for
drinking water utilities.
14See Galant, 1982 for technical specications.
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2003) show that the Translog function is often too inexible to reect the true relationship
between output and costs. Although the Translog specication is often applied to the drinking
water sector (e.g. Saal and Parker, 2000), the Fourier cost function has to our knowledge
never been applied. The Fourier model is specied as:
Ci;t = 1 Qi;t + 2 Q
2
i;t + 1 PLi;t + 2 P
2
Li;t + 1 PCi;t + 2 P
2
Ci;t +
1QPLi;t + 2QPCi;t + 3 PLi;t PCi;t +
NX
j=1
(1j sin(j Qi;t) + 2j cos(j Qi;t)) +
Zi;t + 1TIME + 2TIME
2 +  MERGEi + i;t
(13)
where N denotes the number of sine and cosine terms included (i.e. the grade of the function)
and Z the vector of exogenous characteristics (including the intercept). N is determined by
testing on the basis of an F-test whether the sum of squared residuals (SSR) di¤ers signi-
cantly between two values of N. As such, it tries to capture the true relationship between costs
and inputs and outputs. For instance, testing whether the SSR for N = 0 and N = 1 di¤ers
signicantly, reveals whether a Fourier function of grade 1, which includes sin(Q) and cos(Q),
is statistically preferred against a function of grade 0, i.e. a Translog model. Comparing N
= 1 and N = 2 makes clear whether a Fourier function of grade 2, which includes sin(Q),
sin(2Q), cos(Q) and cos(2Q), is preferred against a Fourier of grade 1. To dene the vector of
exogenous characteristics, Zi;t, a literature review and extensive discussions with sector ex-
perts was undertaken. This resulted in two types of exogenous inuences. As a rst type we
include ve sub factors to correct for the provision area characteristics. These are exogenous
due to the legal regional monopoly. We account for (1) the number of connections per unit
water delivered, (2) network length per unit water, (3) the soil stability15 , (4) the customer
mix (i.e. the proportion of water delivered to medium and large sized businesses) and (5) the
age of the infrastructure (i.e. ageing infrastructure increases maintenance costs but reduces
depreciation and interest). As a second type, we account for diverging purication e¤orts by
including indices measuring (1) the quality di¤erence between raw and drinking water and
(2) the type of raw water used. An overview of the variable is presented in Appendix.
We start from the CD specication and test gradually the robustness of the results by
di¤erent specications. The estimated e¤ects of benchmarking and merger economies, split
into ine¢ ciency reducing abilities and scale economies, are presented in Table 2. As the
scale elasticity di¤ers for each particular evaluated Q, the point elasticity is measured for
three typical types of rms; (1) the average non-merged rm (Q = 59 million m3), (2) the
average merged rm (Q = 111 million m3) and (3) the average of the 5 largest observations
(Q = 236 million m3). In comparison to the CD estimations on the disaggregated data set
(see Table 1), the benchmarking e¤ect on e¢ ciency increases to 18%. The e¤ect of mergers
15Some drinking water utilities deliver water in unstable soil regions which reduces the mainslife span.
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becomes insignicant using the aggregated (orginal) data.16 Although this seems puzzling
at rst sight, the result with aggregated data might be more reliable as the disaggregated
analysis in fact duplicates the observations for merged rms (which is only relevant in the
parametric analysis). As merged rms are split, degrees of freedom are created that do not
exist in reality. In the CD specications, the scale elasticities are the same for the di¤erent
types of rms, indicating that a 1% increase in scale reduces e¢ ciency by 0:09% (decreasing
returns to scale). The Fourier function of grade 0, the Translog, estimates the e¤ect of
benchmarking at 17%, while the e¤ect of MERGE remain insignicantly negative. According
to this specication, only non-merged companies experience signicant decreasing returns to
scale. However, the optimal grade of the Fourier function is higher than 0 as tests point
out that in a narrowmodel with only the number of connections per unit water included
as exogenous variable N equals 4, while the grade equals 3 for the extendedmodel which
includes all exogenous variables. The CD and Translog specication are thus rejected against
the Fourier specication. The narrow Fourier model estimates a signicant positive e¤ect
of benchmarking and a signicant e¢ ciency reducing e¤ect of mergers. It detects increasing
returns to scale for the merged utilities and decreasing returns to scale for the 5 largest
companies. Contrarily, the extendedmodel nds only a signicant e¤ect of the benchmark,
and no signicant merger economies. Finally, we test if the results change by using only
data for companies with a production higher than 25 million m3, which corresponds to the
scale just below the smallest company in 2006. We use this cut-o¤ level as we do not nd a
rejection of constant returns to scale for companies with a larger scale, while economies of
scale are found for very small companies. It is interesting to analyze whether this discontinuity
inuences the results. By restricting the data set to the larger companies, the number of
observations decreases from 242 till 204, while the number of included companies decreases
from 20 to 16. The positive e¤ect on e¢ ciency of benchmarking and the insignicant e¤ect
of merger economies is robust to this data set specication as well.
Summarizing, benchmarking turns out to have a signicant positive e¤ect in all model
specications, while the e¤ect of the merger economies (i.e. scale economies and ine¢ ciency
reducing incentives) is more ambiguous in the di¤erent models. None of the estimations
resulted in a signicant and positive e¤ect of mergers on e¢ ciency.
As the sign and size of the scale economies di¤er for di¤erent values of Q, we present these
graphically for the Fourier model of grade 0 and grade 3. Figure 6 shows the estimated scale
e¤ects for the former, i.e. the Translog model which is frequently employed in the literature.
The quantity of water produced is presented on the horizontal axis and the costs per unit
water is on the vertical axis. The solid line reects for each scale level Q the average estimated
cost per m3, while the crosses reect the 95%-condence level (these are only depicted for
actual observations). Using the Translog, constant returns to scale is not rejected between
16Additionally, all specications were tested with the square of MERGE included. This resulted in insignif-
icant coe¢ cients of MERGE and its square.
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Table 2: Merger economies analyzed
Estim. e¤ect Ine¢ ciency Scale elasticity
Benchmark reduction Non-merged Merged Large
of merger (Q=59) (Q=111) (Q=236)
Cobb-Douglas 18% -3% -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(6%) (2%) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Fourier (N = 0) (i.e. Translog) 17% -3% -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
(6%) (2%) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Fourier (N = 4) 11% -5% 0.03 0.37 -0.59
- Z = number of connections (5%) (2%) (0.12) (0.14) (0.28)
Fourier (N = 3) 20% 0% -0.28 0.45 -0.09
- Z = all exogenous variables (4%) (2%) (1.35) (1.41) (1.43)
Fourier (N = 3) 12% 3% -0.16 -0.05 -1.61
- Z = all variables - only large comp. (4%) (2%) (1.31) (1.36) (1.40)
** and * denotes, respectively, signicance at a 1 and 5%-level
35 and 350 million m3, the condence intervals are however rather large from 150 million m3
on.
Figure 7 presents the results for the Fourier specication of grade 3 (based on the sample
excluding observations for very small rms).17 This gure arrives at two scale levels with
minimal costs. The rst is around 30 million m3, while the second suggests a comparable
low cost level at a much larger scale (i.e. around 200 million m3). Note, however, that the
condence band is much wider for the latter due to the scarce number of observations around
150 millionm3. Indeed, no signicant evidence is found for the hypothesis that mergers would
imply positive scale economies. In fact, average costs are lower for non-merged companies
(which have an average scale of 59 million m3) compared with merged companies (which have
an average scale of 111 million m3), although again, this di¤erence is not signicant.
Summarizing, the results of the parametric approach show the robustness of the previous
analysis. We detect an e¢ ciency enhancing e¤ect of benchmarking, and insignicant merger
economies due to, in general, the absence of both scale economies and increased incentives
to ght ine¢ ciencies.
17Note that we exclude companies with a scale smaller than 25 million m3 as estimates show that includ-
ing these companies destabilizes the results for larger companies. We nd scale economies for these small
companies, which is in accordance with the literature.
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Figure 6: Scale economies with Fourier (N=0; Translog)
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Figure 7: Scale economies with Fourier (N=3)
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7 Conclusion
Studying the e¤ects of benchmarking and mergers in the Dutch drinking water sector, the
paper does not nd an impact of mergers on e¢ ciency. In particular, it ascertains the absence
of the two underlying mechanisms to merger economies, i.e. scale economies and increased
incentives to ght ine¢ ciencies. Although scale economies are present for very small compa-
nies, larger utilities are not producing at lower cost. This observation is especially important
as in many countries the drinking water sector is involved in a debate on the optimal scale of
its utilities. In addition, the paper shows the e¤ectiveness of the incentive regulation, i.e. a
voluntary benchmarking project since 1997. This incentive regulation increased signicantly
the e¢ ciency of the Dutch drinking water companies.
The paper allows to draw some policy implications with respect to mergers which go
beyond the specic Dutch drinking water sectors. Regulators should be cautious with respect
to factors which undermine the e¤ectiveness of incentive regulation. Particularly mergers
undermine the e¤ectiveness of incentive regulation as the remaining utilities could easier
invoke atypical circumstances. If the qualityh of incentive regulation is based on the quality
of information about utilities, which is generally the case, mergers probably decrease the
e¤ectiveness of regulation. It is suggested that regulators should not give the benet of
doubt to merger projects of utilities in an incentive regulation environment if the number of
rms is allready relatively low, which is the case in the Netherlands. On the contrary, these
regulators should consider to break down larger companies into smaller utilities in order to
obtain more comparable units and, hence, further increase the e¤ectiveness of the incentive
regulation.
Although the paper nds a positive e¤ect of benchmarking on e¢ ciency, the Dutch drink-
ing water benchmark is still incomplete. Firstly, the benchmark is a voluntary initiative
(although, currently, all companies cooperate). The Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning
and Environment, who regulates the water sector, recently made a proposal to oblige partic-
ipation to the benchmark. Secondly, the current benchmark does not account for exogenous
characteristics among the drinking water utilities, which makes the presented information
partly incomparable. Thirdly, accounting rules are still not harmonized which results ine.g.
di¤erences in depreciation rates. Finally, the few number of Dutch companies decreases the
e¤ectiveness of the benchmark. An international benchmark study which increases the scope
of the analysis could deliver promising results. It could be expected that the elimination of
these hiatuses will further enhance the e¤ectiveness of the benchmark for the Dutch drinking
water sector.
25
Appendix
Table 3: List of variables
Variable Description
Costs Total real cost per year in 1000 euro
Q Production of drinking water in million m3
PC Capital real costs per unit assets, based on price deator investments
PL Labour real costs per employee, based on price deator labour costs
Connect Number of technical connections per m3
Length Length pipes (transport- and main lines) per m3
Soil Measures instability soil
Purif Measures intensity of purication
Qlarge Deliveries to large size customers (> 10; 000 m3 per year) in % Q
Qmid Deliveries to middle size customers (300 - 10; 000 m3 per year) in % Q
DunesN Use of natural dune water
DunesI Use of inltrated dune water
Age Age infrastructure (book value as % of purchase value)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
All companies Merged Non-merged
Average Max. Min. St. dev. Average Average
Costs 87 381 10 64 133 76
Q 69 335 12 49 111 59
PL 50 66 27 6 52 50
PC 44 103 12 18 35 46
Connect 5.2 7.3 1.6 1.3 5.3 5.2
Length 0.09 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.09
Soil 1.10 1.35 1.00 0.12 1.06 1.11
Purif 8.3 21.8 2.0 6.5 9.1 8.0
Qlarge 0.18 0.45 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.18
Qmid 0.19 0.37 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.19
DunesN 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02
DunesI 0.13 1.03 0.00 0.29 0.23 0.11
Age 0.57 0.74 0.25 0.10 0.53 0.58
Table 5: Mergers in the Dutch drinking water sector 1992 - 2006
Name merger Merged companies* Year of merger
WMO WMO + WOT 1996
DZH DZH + main part EWR 1996
Wgeld WMG + WOG 1997
Wgron Waprog + GWG 1998
WOB WOB + 2 municipalities 1998
Vitens 1 WMO + Wgeld + NuonWF 2002
BW1 WNWB + WOB 2002
Evides WBE + Delta 2004
BW2 BW1 + TWM 2006
Vitens 2 Vitens 1 + HydronMN + HydronFL 2006
* Abbreviations from Vewin (2007)
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